A Theory of the Firm - Governance, Residual Claims & Organizational Forms

Preface ix Introduction 1(8) I Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control 1 U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980's 9(7) 2 The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 16(47) 3 Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy 63(20) II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives 4 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure 83(53) 5 Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory 136(32) 6 Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination 168(37) 7 Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions 205(22) 8 The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors 227(24) Notes 251(26) References 277(24) Acknowledgments 301(4) Index 305