Consciousness, Function and Representation - Collected Papers V 1 : Collected Papers, Volume 1

Introduction: Remarks on Chauvinism and the Mind-Body Problem 1(12) I Functionalism 13(96) Functionalism 15(12) What Is Functionalism? 27(18) What Psychological States Are Not, with J. Fodor 45(18) Troubles with Functionalism 63(40) What Intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Show 103(6) II Concepts of Consciousness 109(188) Consciousness 111(18) Review of Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained 129(12) What Is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? 141(18) On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness 159(56) How Many Concepts of Consciousness? 215(34) Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness 249(20) Ridiculing Social Constructivism about Phenomenal Consciousness 269(6) Concepts of Consciousness 275(22) III Empirical Approaches to Consciousness 297(80) How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness 299(12) Paradox and Cross-Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness 311(28) Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation 339(4) Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness 343(20) Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception 363(14) IV Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 377(122) Are Absent Qualia Impossible? 379(18) The Harder Problem of Consciousness 397(38) Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity 435(64) V Consciousness and Representation 499(118) Qualia 501(10) Inverted Earth 511(22) Mental Paint 533(38) Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness 571(32) Is Experiencing Just Representing? 603(8) Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism 611(6) Name Index 617(8) Subject Index 625