Binmore, Ken

Game Theory & the Social Contract V 2 - Just Playing : Just Playing

Apology vii(10) Series Foreword xvii(2) Reading Guide xix(5) Acknowledgment xxiv Introduction: Setting the Scene 1(58) 0.1 Whither Away? 1(1) 0.2 The Art of Compromise 1(14) 0.2.1 Nonsense upon Stilts 3(1) 0.2.2 Social Contracts 4(2) 0.2.3 Reform 6(2) 0.2.4 The Original Position 8(5) 0.2.5 Bargaining 13(2) 0.3 Moral Philosophy 15(5) 0.3.1 Traditional Philosophical Categories 16(1) 0.3.2 Fin de Siecle 17(3) 0.4 Noncooperative Game Theory 20(18) 0.4.1 The Ultimatum Game 21(8) 0.4.2 Anomalies? 29(9) 0.5 Cooperative Game Theory 38(4) 0.5.1 Games in Coalitional Form 38(4) 0.6 Nash Program 42(7) 0.7 Implementation 49(10) 1 Nuances of Negotiation 59(86) 1.1 Realistic Bargaining Models 59(1) 1.2 Bargaining Problems 60(17) 1.2.1 Payoff Regions 60(4) 1.2.2 Nash Bargaining Problems 64(2) 1.2.3 The Bargaining Set 66(3) 1.2.4 Dividing the Dollar 69(4) 1.2.5 Edgeworth Box 73(4) 1.3 Bargaining Solutions 77(11) 1.3.1 Nash Bargaining Solution 77(5) 1.3.2 Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution 82(1) 1.3.3 Bargaining with Interpersonal Comparison 83(5) 1.4 Characterizing Bargaining Solutions 88(12) 1.4.1 The Kalai-Smorodinsky Axioms 89(5) 1.4.2 The Nash Axioms 94(2) 1.4.3 Renegotiation Axioms 96(4) 1.5 Bargaining with Commitment 100(8) 1.5.1 Nash Demand Game 100(4) 1.5.2 Fixed and Variable Threats 104(4) 1.6 Trustless Transactions 108(12) 1.6.1 Repeated Games 109(3) 1.6.2 Transitional Arrangements 112(8) 1.7 Bargaining without Commitment 120(15) 1.7.1 The Alternating Offers Game 122(8) 1.7.2 How Realistic is Rubinstein's Model? 130(5) 1.8 Other Approaches to Bargaining 135(10) 1.8.1 The Coase Theorem 136(3) 1.8.2 Gauthier on Bargaining over a Social Contract 139(6) 2 Evolution in Eden 145(118) 2.1 The Good, the Right, and the Seemly 145(2) 2.2 Utilitarianism 147(20) 2.2.1 Summum Bonum 150(1) 2.2.2 Ipsedixists 150(2) 2.2.3 Ideal Observers 152(4) 2.2.4 Philosopher-King 156(3) 2.2.5 The Social Contract Approach 159(2) 2.2.6 Rule-Utilitarianism or Act-Utilitarianism? 161(3) 2.2.7 The Big Picture 164(3) 2.3 Fictitious Postulatum? 167(11) 2.3.1 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility 168(10) 2.4 Evolutionary Ethics 178(5) 2.5 Evolution and Justice 183(45) 2.5.1 Reciprocity 186(1) 2.5.2 Kinship 187(17) 2.5.3 Equilibrium Selection 204(8) 2.5.4 Empathy and Fairness 212(14) 2.5.5 The Long and the Short and the Medium 226(2) 2.6 Nonteleological Utilitarianism 228(22) 2.6.1 Commitment in Eden 229(13) 2.6.2 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run 242(5) 2.6.3 Retelling the Rawlsian Story 247(3) 2.7 Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon 250(8) 2.7.1 The Princess and the Pea 251(2) 2.7.2 How Justice Works 253(5) 2.8 Why Not Utilitarianism? 258(5) 3 Rationalizing Reciprocity 263(112) 3.1 Back-scratching 263(10) 3.2 Rights in a Theory of the Seemly 273(20) 3.2.1 Rights as Strategies? 275(2) 3.2.2 Rules for Sustaining an Equilibrium 277(1) 3.2.3 Moral Responsibility 278(4) 3.2.4 Free Will 282(10) 3.2.5 Nil Desperandum! 292(1) 3.3 Folk Theorem 293(35) 3.3.1 Memes 294(1) 3.3.2 Finite Automata 295(2) 3.3.3 Computing Payoffs 297(2) 3.3.4 Reciprocal Sharing 299(6) 3.3.5 Crime and Punishment 305(5) 3.3.6 Guardians Who Guard Each Other 310(3) 3.3.7 Tit for Tat? 313(6) 3.3.8 How Does Cooperation Evolve? 319(9) 3.4 Social Contracts in Big Societies 328(10) 3.4.1 Social Transfers 328(3) 3.4.2 Friendship and Coalitions 331(1) 3.4.3 Police Forces 331(2) 3.4.4 Punishing the Innocent 333(2) 3.4.5 Leadership and Authority 335(3) 3.5 The Role of the Emotions 338(6) 3.5.1 Sore Thumbs 338(1) 3.5.2 Tunnel Vision 339(5) 3.6 Due Process 344(4) 3.6.1 Anarchy to Statehood 345(2) 3.6.2 Natural Equilibrium 347(1) 3.7 Renegotiation 348(9) 3.7.1 Getting from Here to There 349(3) 3.7.2 Renegotiation in the Original Position 352(2) 3.7.3 Making the Punishment Fit the Crime 354(2) 3.7.4 Renegotiation-Proofness 356(1) 3.8 What about Moral Values? 357(18) 3.8.1 Confusing Tastes and Values 358(9) 3.8.2 Das Adam Smith Problem 367(2) 3.8.3 Postwelfarism 369(2) 3.8.4 What Moral Relativism Is Not 371(4) 4 Yearning for Utopia 375(134) 4.1 Introduction 375(1) 4.2 Envy 376(5) 4.3 Equity in Economics 381(15) 4.3.1 Envy-Freeness 382(9) 4.3.2 Welfarism 391(5) 4.4 Equity in Psychology 396(5) 4.5 Equity in Anthropology 401(21) 4.5.1 Sharing and Caring 402(3) 4.5.2 Enforcement in Foraging Societies 405(5) 4.5.3 Anarchy in Prehistory? 410(3) 4.5.4 Kinship in Small Groups 413(9) 4.6 The Game of Morals 422(32) 4.6.1 Fair Social Contracts 422(2) 4.6.2 Paradise Lost 424(1) 4.6.3 Modeling the Original Position 425(5) 4.6.4 When is Justice Dispensed? 430(6) 4.6.5 Rawls Vindicated! 436(3) 4.6.6 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run 439(8) 4.6.7 Consensus and Context 447(2) 4.6.8 Morality in the Short Run 449(1) 4.6.9 Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism 450(3) 4.6.10 Paradise Regained? 453(1) 4.7 Worthiness and Power 454(17) 4.7.1 Will to Power? 455(3) 4.7.2 Comparative Statics 458(2) 4.7.3 To Each According to His Need? 460(4) 4.7.4 Arbeit Macht Frei? 464(2) 4.7.5 From Each According to His Ability? 466(2) 4.7.6 The High and the Lowly 468(1) 4.7.7 Socialism versus Capitalism 469(2) 4.8 The Market and the Long Run 471(24) 4.8.1 The Walrasian Bargaining Solution 476(7) 4.8.2 Misrepresenting Personal Preferences 483(9) 4.8.3 The Concept of a Fair Price 492(1) 4.8.4 Time Corrupts All 493(2) 4.9 Unfinished Business 495(4) 4.9.1 Large Societies and Coalitions 495(1) 4.9.2 Incomplete Information and Mechanism Design 496(2) 4.9.3 A Changing Game of Life 498(1) 4.10 A Perfect Commonwealth? 499(7) 4.10.1 What is Whiggery? 499(4) 4.10.2 Where is Whiggery? 503(3) 4.11 Humean and Humane 506(3) Appendices 509(37) A Really Meaning It! 511(12) A.1 Naturalism 511(1) A.1.1 Causal Reversals 512(1) A.2 Modeling Man 513(3) A.2.1 Strength of Body 516(1) A.2.2 Reason 517(2) A.2.3 Passions 519(1) A.2.4 Experience 520(3) B Harsanyi Scholarship 523(10) B.1 Introduction 523(1) B.2 Teleological Utilitarianism 524(5) B.3 Nonteleological Utilitarianism 529(4) C Bargaining Theory 533(13) C.1 Introduction 533(1) C.2 Alternating Offers Game 533(2) C.3 Preferences 535(2) C.4 Stationary Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 537(2) C.5 Nonstationary Equilibria 539(3) C.6 Generalized Nash Bargaining Solutions 542(2) C.7 Nash Program 544(2) Bibliography 546(33) Index 579