Political Competition - Theory and Applications : Theory And Applications

Preface xi Introduction 1(188) 1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty 13(25) 1.1 Citizens, Voters, and Parties 13(3) 1.2 The Downs Model 16(12) 1.3 The Wittman Model 28(8) 1.4 Conclusion 36(2) 2. Modeling Party Uncertainty 38(14) 2.1 Introduction 38(1) 2.2 The State-Space Approach to Uncertainty 39(6) 2.3 An Error-Distribution Model of Uncertainty 45(2) 2.4 A Finite-Type Model 47(4) 2.5 Conclusion 51(1) 3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty 52(21) 3.1 Introduction 52(1) 3.2 The Downs Model 52(3) 3.3 The Wittman Model: An Example 55(6) 3.4 Existence of Wittman Equilibrium 61(8) 3.5 Properties of Wittman Equilibrium 69(2) 3.6 Summary 71(2) 4. Applications of the Wittman Model 73(17) 4.1 Simple Models of Redistribution: The Politics of Extremism 73(3) 4.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium with Labor-Supply Elasticity 76(5) 4.3 Partisan Dogmatism and Political Extremism 81(1) 4.4 A Dynamic Model of Political Cycles 82(7) 4.5 Conclusion 89(1) 5. Endogenous Parties: The Unidimensional Case 90(13) 5.1 Introduction 90(1) 5.2 Average-Member Nash Equilibrium 91(3) 5.3 Condorcet-Nash Equilibrium 94(7) 5.4 Conclusion 101(2) 6. Political Competition over Several Issues: The Case of Certainty 103(21) 6.1 Introduction 103(1) 6.2 The Downs Model 103(13) 6.3 The Wittman Model 116(6) 6.4 Conclusion 122(2) 7. Multidimensional Issue Spaces and Uncertainty: The Downs Model 124(21) 7.1 Introduction 124(1) 7.2 The State-Space and Error-Distribution Models of Uncertainty 124(3) 7.3 The Coughlin Model 127(3) 7.4 The Lindbeck-Weibull Model 130(4) 7.5 Adapting the Coughlin Model to the Case of Aggregate Uncertainty 134(10) 7.6 Conclusion 144(1) 8. Party Factions and Nash Equilibrium 145(27) 8.1 Introduction 145(3) 8.2 Party Factions 148(7) 8.3 PUNE as a Bargaining Equilibrium 155(4) 8.4 A Differential Characterization of PUNE 159(4) 8.5 Regular Wittman Equilibrium 163(3) 8.6 PUNEs in the Unidimensional Model 166(1) 8.7 PUNEs in a Multidimensional Euclidean Model 167(3) 8.8 Conclusion 170(2) 9. The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Taxation 172(17) 9.1 Introduction 172(1) 9.2 The Model 173(5) 9.3 The Equilibrium Concepts 178(1) 9.4 Analysis of Party Competition 179(7) 9.5 Calibration 186(1) 9.6 Conclusion 187(2) 10. Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies 189(20) 10.1 The Historical Issue and a Model Preview 189(3) 10.2 The Politico-Economic Environment 192(3) 10.3 Analysis of PUNEs 195(3) 10.4 Empirical Tests 198(4) 10.5 Proofs of Theorems 202(5) 10.6 Concluding Remark 207(2) 11. Distributive Class Politics and the Political Geography of Interwar Europe 209(42) 11.1 Introduction 209(3) 11.2 The Luebbert Model 212(6) 11.3 Testing Luebbert's Theory 218(12) 11.4 Introducing the Communists: A Three-Party Model 230(11) 11.5 Conclusion 241(1) 11.6 Methodological Coda 242(2) Appendix 11A 244(7) 12. A Three-Class Model of American Politics 251(8) 12.1 Introduction 251(2) 12.2 The Model 253(1) 12.3 Characterization of PUNEs 254(2) 12.4 Results 256(1) 12.5 Conclusion 257(2) 13. Endogenous Parties with Multidimensional Competition 259(22) 13.1 Introduction 259(1) 13.2 Endogenous Parties 260(1) 13.3 Taxation and Race 261(2) 13.4 Fitting the Model to U.S. Data 263(6) 13.5 Quadratic Taxation 269(7) 13.6 Private Financing of Parties 276(1) 13.7 A Technical Remark on the Existence of PUNEs 277(2) 13.8 Conclusion 279(1) 13.9 Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: Reprise 279(2) 14. Toward a Model of Coalition Government 281(28) 14.1 Introduction 281(1) 14.2 The Payoff Function of a Wittman Party 282(8) 14.3 An Example of Coalition Government: Unidimensional Wittman Equilibrium 290(6) 14.4 Multidimensional Three-Party Politics 296(3) 14.5 Coalition Government with a Multidimensional Issue Space: An Example 299(5) 14.6 Conclusion 304(5) Mathematical Appendix 309(14) A.1 Basics of Probability Theory 309(9) A.2 Some Concepts from Analysis 318(5) References 323(4) Index 327