Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy : Explaining Economic Policy

Series Foreword xiii Foreword xv Preface xvii General Introduction 1(14) Economic Policy 6(4) Politics 10(4) Concluding Remarks 14(1) I TOOLS OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS 15(100) Preferences and Institutions 19(28) A General Policy Problem 19(2) Restricting Preferences 21(7) Restricting Institutions 28(12) Discussion 40(1) Notes on the Literature 41(1) Problems 41(6) Electoral Competition 47(22) A Simple Model of Public Finance 48(1) Downsian Electoral Competition 49(2) Median-Voter Equilibria 51(1) Probabilistic Voting 52(6) Lobbying 58(4) Discussion 62(1) Notes on the Literature 63(1) Problems 64(5) Agency 69(28) Efficient Electoral Competition 70(1) Inefficient Electoral Competition 71(2) Enforceability, Verifiability, and Observability 73(4) Electoral Accountability 77(4) Career Concerns 81(6) Discussion 87(2) Notes on the Literature 89(2) Problems 91(6) Partisan Politicians 97(18) Policy Convergence 97(2) Policy Divergence 99(2) Endogenous Candidates 101(3) Legislative Bargaining 104(4) Discussion 108(1) Notes on the Literature 109(1) Problems 110(5) II REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 115(86) General-Interest Politics 117(42) General Transfers 118(5) Pensions 123(9) Regional Transfers 132(8) Unemployment Insurance 140(9) Discussion 149(2) Notes on the Literature 151(3) Problems 154(5) Special-Interest Politics 159(42) A Model of Local Public Goods 161(3) Legislative Bargaining 164(7) Lobbying 171(4) Electoral Competition 175(5) Interactions 180(11) Discussion 191(1) Notes on the Literature 192(3) Problems 195(6) III COMPARATIVE POLITICS 201(74) Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition 205(20) The Economic Model 206(1) The Politics of Electoral Competition 207(3) Single-District (Proportional) Elections 210(2) Multiple-District (Majoritarian) Elections 212(3) Broad Versus Targeted Redistribution 215(3) Discussion 218(2) Notes on the Literature 220(1) Problems 221(4) Institutions and Accountability 225(26) Electoral Rules and Career Concerns 226(8) Electoral Rules and Accountability 234(5) Separation of Powers 239(6) Notes on the Literature 245(1) Problems 246(5) Political Regimes 251(24) Policy Choices in a Simple Legislature 253(6) Presidential-Congressional Regimes 259(3) Parliamentary Regimes 262(4) Discussion 266(2) Notes on the Literature 268(1) Problems 269(6) IV DYNAMIC POLITICS 275(118) Dynamic Policy Problems 277(28) Analyzing Dynamic Policy Games 278(8) Examples 286(12) Discussion 298(1) Notes on the Literature 299(1) Problems 300(5) Capital Taxation 305(40) A Simple Model of Dynamic Taxation 306(1) Credibility 307(10) Politics 317(8) Tax Competition 325(11) Discussion 336(2) Notes on the Literature 338(1) Problems 339(6) Public Debt 345(28) A Simple Model of Public Debt 346(2) The Dynamic Common-Pool Problem 348(3) Political Instability 351(10) Delayed Stabilizations 361(3) Debt and Intergenerational Politics 364(2) Discussion 366(1) Notes on the Literature 367(2) Problems 369(4) Growth 373(20) Income Inequality and Growth 374(3) Political Instability and Growth 377(2) Special Interests, Rents, and Growth 379(5) Other Political Determinants of Growth 384(1) Discussion 385(1) Notes on the Literature 386(1) Problems 387(6) V MONETARY POLITICS 393(96) Credibility of Monetary Policy 397(22) A Simple Model of Monetary Policy 397(2) Ex Ante Optimality 399(2) Credibility 401(4) Reputation 405(3) Dynamics 408(4) Notes on the Literature 412(2) Problems 414(5) Electoral Cycles 419(16) Career Concerns and Political Business Cycles 420(6) Partisan Cycles 426(4) Notes on the Literature 430(1) Problems 431(4) Institutions and Incentives 435(24) Simple Rules and Escape Clauses 436(5) Central Bank Independence 441(4) Inflation Targets and Contracts 445(7) Notes on the Literature 452(1) Problems 453(6) International Policy Coordination 459(20) A Simple Two-Country Model 460(2) Incentives 462(5) Institutions 467(6) Discussion 473(1) Notes on the Literature 474(1) Problems 475(4) What Next? 479(10) Some Positive Questions 479(4) Analytical Issues 483(5) Concluding Remarks 488(1) References 489(26) Author Index 515(6) Subject Index 521