Political Economics Workbook - Explaining Economic Policy

I Tools of political economics 1(54) Preferences and institutions 3(14) Existence and non existence of a Condorcet winner under simple majority rule 3(2) Simple majority rule and uni-dimensional public consumption 5(2) Labor and consumption taxation 7(2) Multidimensional public consumption in the presence of a Condorcet winner 9(4) Structure induced equilibrium and multidimensional public consumption 13(4) Electoral competition 17(10) Non credible commitments and probabilistic voting 17(2) Downsian competition in a simple public good model 19(1) A simple model of probabilistic voting 20(2) Probabilistic voting in the presence of groups of voters 22(3) Lobbying 25(2) Agency 27(14) Political rents in lop-sided elections 27(4) Political rents with term limits 31(2) Electoral cycles with seignorage 33(3) Equilibrium selection in the adverse selection model 36(2) Challenger selection procedure 38(3) Partisan politicians 41(14) Probabilistic voting with outcome-seeking politicians 41(2) The citizen-candidate model 43(2) Lobbying in a representative democracy 45(4) Equilibria when the single-crossing condition is violated 49(2) The agenda-setting model 51(2) Rents with endogenous value of being in office 53(2) II Redistributive politics 55(30) General-interest politics 57(14) The Meltzer-Richard model 57(2) Pensions 59(3) Pensions and probabilistic voting 62(3) Unemployment insurance 65(1) Unemployment insurance with multiple equilibria 66(5) Special-interest politics 71(14) Legislative bargaining with amendment rights 71(3) Budgetary powers and amendments rights in legislatures 74(2) Truthful strategies in the lobbying model 76(1) Coalition formation in a three-party legislature 77(3) Legislative bargaining and lobbying 80(5) III Comparative Politics 85(34) Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition 87(10) Proportional elections and concave utility 87(3) Existence of majoritarian equilibria 90(2) Distortionary taxes and electoral competition 92(1) Districts and voter groups that do not coincide 93(1) Broad vs. Targeted policy 94(3) Institutions and Accountability 97(10) Local vs. national elections and externalities among local public goods 97(3) Yardstick competition 100(1) Groups with coordinated voting 101(2) Checks and balances with bilateral bargaining 103(1) Separation of powers and the common pool problem 104(3) Political Regimes 107(12) A model with a prime minister 107(1) Adding a president 108(2) Infinitely repeated presidential-congressional regime 110(2) The ``caretaker government'' subgame 112(1) Calculating the equilibria in the Parliamentary regime 113(1) Presidential regime with line-item veto 114(5) IV Dynamic politics 119(60) Dynamic policy problems 121(16) Debt structure, labor taxation and money 121(3) Credibility problems in labor taxation when government consumption is endogenous 124(3) Debt structure and labor taxation 127(3) Capital taxation and inflation surprise 130(4) Labor and capital taxation when agents are heterogeneous 134(3) Capital taxation 137(16) Multiple equilibria and credibility in taxation problems 137(4) Solving time-inconsistency problems through social contracts 141(5) Tax competition and international cooperation 146(3) The effects of capital mobility on taxation 149(4) Public debt 153(16) Preelection politics and government spending when parties are opportunistic 153(3) Population structure's influence on dynamic inconsistency 156(3) When there is overindebtedness 159(2) Endogenous (in) efficiency of the tax system 161(3) Voting on the budget deficit: Consequences of a balanced budget rule 164(5) Growth 169(10) Public debt, political instability and growth 169(2) Inequality and growth-human capital 171(2) Unions and taxation 173(2) Growth and the common-pool problem 175(1) Inequality and growth: a specific functional form for A(I) 176(3) V Monetary politics 179 Credibility of monetary policy 181 Reputation with state-dependent incentives 181 Optimal punishment rules 183 Reputation with incomplete information 185 The inflation and stabilization biases 188 Monetary policy with employment persistence 191 Inflation and default 196 Electoral cycles 201 Timing, moral hazard, adverse selection and the political business cycle 201 Partisan political competition and the strategic use of inflation 204 Monetary policy in majoritarian elections 208 Monetary policy in proportional elections 210 Institutions and incentives 213 Escape clauses within a simple rule 213 Endogenous credibility of the central bank 216 Political competition and optimal delegation 218 Optimal delegation with persistent output shocks 220 Optimal delegation when ther is employment persistence 222 International policy coordination 227 Commitment and cooperation 227 Output directly dependent on the real exchange rate 230 Exchange rate pegs with symmetric supply shocks 232 Exchange rate pegs with asymmetric supply shocks 234 Endogenous exchange rate pegs 236