Newberry, David M.

Privatization, Restructuring & Regulation of Network Utilities

Preface ix Abbreviation and Units xiii Introduction 1(26) Privatization in Britain 6(7) U.K. Privatization Program 13(4) Property Rights, Structure, and Efficiency 17(1) Ownership and the Boundaries of the State 18(9) Appendix: Enterprises Privatized, 1979 to 1994 24(3) The Problem of Regulatory Commitment 27(54) Modeling the Regulatory Compact as a Game 30(5) Playing the Game: Commitment, Credibility, and Repetition 35(3) Rate-of-Return Regulation 38(12) Extensions: The ``Used and Useful'' Doctrine 44(6) Price Regulation 50(2) Design of Regulatory Institutions 52(5) Role of Licenses in U.K. Utility Regulation 57(3) Privatization and Regulation in Transitional Economies 60(12) Telecommunications Privatization in the Czech Republic 65(1) Preparations for Electricity Privatization in Hungary 66(6) Conclusions 72(9) Appendix A: Modeling Regulation as a Dynamic Game 73(5) Appendix B: U.K. Legislative Framework for Telecoms and Electricity 78(3) Ownership of Network Utilities 81(52) Local Utilities and Municipal Ownership 82(1) Nationwide Network Utilities 82(4) Capitalism and Pragmatic Nationalization 83(1) Public Ownership as Ideology or Default 84(2) Macroeconomic Performance of Public Enterprises 86(9) Public Enterprise Performance in the United Kingdom 95(1) Efficiency of Public and Privately Owned Network Utilites 95(11) Effects of Ownership Changes 106(27) Nationalization 106(5) Privatization 111(8) Case Studies of Electricity Privatization 119(3) Case Studies of Telecommunications Privatizations 122(4) Lessons from the Privatization Case Studies 126(2) Appendix: Evaluating Distributional Impacts 128(5) Theories of Regulation 133(38) Normative and Positive Theories of Regulation 136(8) Positive Theories of Regulation 139(2) Interest Group Theories of Regulation 141(3) Interest Group Influence on the English Electricity Industry 144(8) Dynamics of Regulatory Reform in the Bell Telephone System 152(8) Assessment of the Dynamics of Regulatory Change 160(2) Competition versus Regulation 162(9) Evidence from U.S. Airline Deregulation 167(4) Introducing Competition into Network Utilities 171(28) State Ownership and Competition 176(2) Liberalizaing Entry while Retaining State Ownership 178(2) Procompetitive Reforms of State-Owned Utilities 180(5) The Case for State Ownership of the Network 185(1) Assessment of Competition and State Ownership 186(1) Vertical Separation or Liberalized Access? 187(12) Restructuring Options in Different Utilities 188(3) Restructuring Choices and the Dynamics of Unbundling 191(8) Reforming the Electricity Supply Industry 199(92) Vertical Separation in Electricity: The English Example 201(3) Creating Markets for Electricity 204(3) Restructuring the CEGB and the Creation of the Electricity Pool 207(28) Dealing with Risk and Transition: The Role of the Contract Market 211(10) Progress in Introducing Competition 221(7) Competition in Supply 228(1) Competition in the Captial Market 229(2) Vertical Re-integration and the MMC Generator References 231(4) Was the Restructuring of the CEGB Worth It? 235(11) Cost-Benefit Studies of the Rest of the U.K. ESI 241(2) An Assessment of the Three ESI Privatizations 243(3) Creating Electricity Markets in Other Countries 246(23) Scandinavia 246(4) Latin America 250(5) Australia 255(3) New Zealand 258(1) United States 258(6) Transmission Pricing and Investment 264(5) Electricity Markets: Lessons from the Case Studies 269(10) Conclusions 279(12) Appendix: Modeling the Electricity Pool 282(9) Liberalizing the Telecommunications Industry 291(52) Pricing and Regulatory Inefficiencies 292(17) Pressures for Competition in International Telecoms Markets 301(5) Regulatory Inefficiencies 306(1) Cross-country Comparisons of Telecoms 307(2) Distinctive Features of the Telecoms Industry 309(6) Possibility of Competition 315(14) Liberalization in the United States 316(6) Reforms in Britain 322(7) Lessons to Be Drawn 329(8) Restructuring at Privatization 329(2) Creating a More Competitive Structure 331(1) Restrictions on Competition and Asymmetric Regulation 332(1) Design of Regulation 333(2) Access Pricing 335(2) Conclusions 337(6) Appendix: Telecoms Costs and TELRIC 338(5) Deregulation and Restructuring in Gas 343(42) Similarities and Differences between Gas and Electricity 346(15) Technical Characteristics of Gas 353(2) Market Structures and Access Arrangements in Gas 355(2) Requirements for Liberalization 357(4) Experience of Liberalization in the United States 361(2) Restructuring British Gas 363(16) Restructuring and Competition 370(4) Regulating Transmission and Further Unbundling 374(5) Gas Liberalization on the Continent 379(4) Conclusions 383(2) Conclusions 385(40) Restructuring Network Utilities 389(3) Entry 392(3) Institutional Innovations Needed for Liberalization 395(4) Dispute Resolution 399(7) Differences between the Network Utilities 406(15) Liberalizing Telecomes 406(2) Access Pricing and Vertical Integration 408(2) Introducing Competition into Electricity 410(2) Liberalizing Electricity: Pools versus the Singl-Buyer Model 412(7) Gas Liberalization 419(2) End of Regulation? 421(4) Appendix: Excess Entry in Oligopolies 423(2) Notes 425(14) References 439(14) Index 453