Social Foraging Theory

Preface xi Acknowledgments xv Social Foraging Theory: Definitions, Concepts, and Methods 3(32) What Is Social Foraging? 3(3) Concepts and Methods of Social Foraging Theory 6(9) Interactions Among Social Foragers 15(2) Concluding Remarks 17(18) Math Boxes 1.1-1.3 19(16) PART One: Group Membership Games Two-Person Games: Competitive Solutions 35(19) Introduction 35(1) Achieving an Aggregation Economy 36(4) A Symmetric Group Membership Game 40(3) An Asymmetric Group Membership Game 43(5) Concluding Remarks 48(6) Math Box 2.1 50(4) Two-Person Games: Conditional Cooperation 54(31) Introduction 54(2) Food-Sharing with a Communal Cost 56(10) Food-Calling and Cooperation 66(7) Concluding Remarks 73(12) Math Boxes 3.1-3.3 78(7) Group Size in Aggregation Economies 85(34) Introduction 85(2) Which Group Size to Expect? 87(3) The Effect of Genetic Relatedness on Equilibrium Group Size 90(6) Integrating Entry Rules, Relatedness, and Aggressive Dominance 96(4) Risk-Sensitive Group Membership Games 100(9) Concluding Remarks 109(10) Math Boxes 4.1-4.4 113(6) Predicting Group Size in Dispersion Economies 119(32) Introduction 119(2) Introduction to Continuous Input Models 121(2) Changing the Assumptions of Continuous Input Models 123(14) Introduction to Interference Models 137(3) Changing the Assumptions of Interference Models 140(6) Concluding Remarks 146(5) PART Two: Producer-Scrounger Decisions An Introduction to Producer-Scrounger Games 151(23) Introduction 151(1) The Diversity of Kleptoparasitism 152(1) Kleptoparasitism: A Game-Theoretic Approach 153(2) A Symmetric Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 155(9) Empirical Tests of the Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 164(4) Concluding Remarks 168(6) Math Box 6.1 170(4) Producer-Scrounger Games in Stochastic Environments 174(31) Introduction 174(1) A Stochastic Producer-Scrounger Game 174(6) Analysis of the Stochastic Game 180(4) Numerical Evaluation 184(10) Experimental Evidence of Risk-Sensitive Producer-Scrounger Decisions 194(2) Concluding Remarks 196(9) Math Boxes 7.1-7.2 199(6) PART Three: Decisions within Patches Social Patch and Prey Models 205(24) Introduction 205(1) Models of Social Patch Exploitation 206(14) Tests of Social Patch Models 220(2) Social Prey Models 222(3) Concluding Remarks 225(4) PART Four: Models of Phenotypic Diversity Quantifying Phenotypic Diversity 229(24) Composition of Foraging Groups 229(3) Quantifying Variability in Foraging Behavior 232(2) Phenotypic Diversity 234(12) Concluding Remarks 246(7) Math Box 9.1 248(5) Learning in Foraging Groups 253(34) Introduction 253(1) Some Functional Definitions of Learning 253(2) Learning How: Individual Learning Only 255(2) Models of Individual Learning Only 257(12) Learning How: Social Learning 269(2) Models with Both Individual and Social Learning How 271(6) Learning About: Individual Learning 277(1) Learning About: Social Learning 277(3) Concluding Remarks 280(7) Math Boxes 10.1-10.3 282(5) Efficiency of Diversity: The Skill Pool 287(38) Background 288(1) A Skill Pool: Static Model 289(13) A Skill Pool: Stochastic Dynamic Model 302(13) Conclusions 315(10) Math Box 11.1 322(3) PART Five: Final Thoughts Synthesis and Conclusions 325(10) Introduction 325(1) Group Membership Models 325(5) Searching Decisions within Groups 330(1) Models for Decisions within Patches 331(1) Models of Phenotypic Diversity 332(2) Conclusions 334(1) References 335(24) Subject Index 359(2) Species Index 361