The Military and Democracy in Indonesia : Challenges, Politics, and Power

Preface iii Figures ix Tables xi Summary xiii Acknowledgments xxi Acronyms and Definitions xxiii Introduction 1(6) Part I---THE TNI Origins and Institutional Development of the Armed Forces 7(18) The Founding of the Armed Forces 7(2) Military Culture and Doctrine 9(3) Military Organization and Deployment 12(10) Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) 14(2) Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus) 16(2) Territorial Forces 18(2) Naval and Air Forces 20(2) Military Operations 22(3) Doctrinal Change: From ``Total People's Defense and Security'' to the ``New Paradigm'' 25(6) Changes in the Intelligence Function 31(4) The Changing Political Role of the Military 35(18) The Military Under Suharto 35(3) The Habibie interregnum and the East Timor Crisis 38(3) Wahid's Tenuous Relationship with the TNI 41(2) The Megawati Consensus 43(4) Civil-Military Relations in the New Democratic Order 47(6) The Military and Parliament 47(2) ``Civilianization'' of the Public Administration 49(1) No More ``Practical Politics'' 49(1) Civilian Ministers of Defense 50(3) Inside the TNI: Career Patterns, Factionalism, and Military Cohesion 53(16) Officer Recruitment 53(2) Army Career Patterns 55(2) Military Schools 57(2) The Promotions System 59(2) Religions of the Military 61(2) Ethnicity of the Military 63(1) Reformers and Conservatives in the Officer Corps 64(2) Solidarity of the Armed Forces: Unity or Factionalism? 66(3) The Military's Funding and Economic Interests 69(12) Army Business Interests 74(1) Navy Business Interests 75(1) Air Force Business Interests 76(1) Police Business Interests 76(1) Noninstitutional Business Activities 76(1) The Debate over Military Self-Financing 77(4) PART II---SECURITY CHALLENGES The Challenge of Terrorism and Religious Extremism 81(10) International Terrorist Networks in Indonesia 82(2) Domestic Extremists 84(3) Moderates and Radicals 87(1) Riding a Tiger: The Indonesian Government's Response to Radical Islam 88(3) Communal Conflict in Eastern and Central Indonesia 91(8) The Conflict in the Moluccas 91(3) The Conflict in Poso 94(2) The Search for Peace in Poso and the Moluccas 96(3) Separatist Movements in Aceh and Papua 99(14) The War in Aceh 99(7) The GAM Insurgency 100(2) Jakarta's Response 102(4) Separatism in Papua 106(7) PART III---THE FUTURE OF U.S.--INDONESIAN MILITARY RELATIONS The Rocky Course of U.S.--Indonesian Military Relations 113(8) U.S.--Indonesian Military Relations in the Era of Terrorism 116(2) Measuring the Effects of Engagement 118(3) Influence 119(1) Access 120(1) Professionalization 120(1) Strategic Scenarios for Indonesia and Their Implications 121(10) Scenario 1: Democratic Consolidation 122(1) Policy Implications for Counterterrorism 122(1) Policy Implications for Engagement 123(1) Scenario 2: Muddling Through 123(2) Policy Implications for Counterterrorism 124(1) Policy Implications for Engagement 124(1) Scenario 3: Return to Authoritarian Rule 125(2) Policy Implications for Counterterrorism 126(1) Policy Implications for Engagement 126(1) Scenario 4: Radical Islamic Influence or Control 127(1) Policy Implications for Counterterrorism 128(1) Policy Implications for Engagement 128(1) Scenario 5: Radical Decentralization 128(1) General Policy Implications 129(1) Scenario 6: Disintegration 129(2) General Policy Implications 130(1) Goals for Indonesian Military Reform and Elements of a U.S. Engagement Strategy 131(8) Goals for Indonesian Military Reform 131(3) Reform of the Territorial System 132(1) Civil-Military Relations 132(1) Military Financing 133(1) Human Rights 133(1) Links to Rogue Groups and Muslim Extremists 134(1) Elements of a Strategy of Engagement with Indonesia 134(5) Appendix Can Indonesia Meet the Leahy Amendment Conditions? 139(4) Bibliography 143