Governing the Firm

1. Introduction: 1.1 Economic systems; 1.2 The control dimension; 1.3 Looking for clues; 1.4 A projected synthesis; 1.5 The plan of the book; 2. Normative perspectives: 2.1 Why care about workers' control?; 2.2 Equality; 2.3 Democracy; 2.4 Property; 2.5 Dignity; 2.6 Community; 2.7 The author shows his cards; 3. Workers' control in action (I): 3.1 Surveying the terrain; 3.2 The Plywood cooperatives; 3.3 The Mondragon cooperatives; 4. Workers' control in action (II): 4.1 The Lega cooperatives; 4.2 Employee stock ownership plans; 4.3 Codetermination; 5. Conceptual foundations: 5.1 The theory of the firm; 5.2 The nature of authority; 5.3 The locus of control; 5.4 Why firms cannot be owned; 5.5 Asset ownership; 5.6 Residual claims; 6. Explanatory strategies: 6.1 The symmetry principle; 6.2 The replication principle; 6.3 Transaction costs; 6.4 Optimal contracting; 6.5 Adverse selection; 6.6 Repeated games; 6.7 Path dependence; 6.8 Cultural explanations; 6.9 The strategy to be pursued; 7. A question of objectives: 7.1 What do labor-managed firms maximize?; 7.2 The Illyrian firm; 7.3 Membership markets and labor markets; 7.4 Membership markets and stock markets; 7.5 Imperfect membership markets; 7.6 What does the evidence say?; 7.7 Some lessons; 8. Views from economic theory I: 8.1 Explaining the rarity of workers' control; 8.2 Asset ownership: incentives and information; 8.3 Asset ownership: bargaining and information; 8.4 Can asset specificity explain the rarity of workers' control?; 8.5 Work incentives without risk aversion; 8.6 Work incentives with risk aversion; 8.7 Can work incentives explain the rarity of workers' control?; 9. Views from economic theory (II): 9.1 Capital constraints; 9.2 Debt financing; 9.3 Equity financing; 9.4 Can capital constraints explain the rarity of workers' control?; 9.5 Portfolio diversification; 9.6 Can portfolio diversification explain the rarity of workers' control?; 9.7 Collective choice; 9.8 Can collective choice explain the rarity of workers' control?; 10. Transitions and clusters: 10.1 Organizational demography; 10.2 Formation rates; 10.3 Worker takeovers; 10.4 Degeneration; 10.5 Investor takeovers; 10.6 Survival rates; 10.7 Business cycles; 10.8 Clusters; 11. Toward a synthesis: 11.1 The causal tapestry; 11.2 Credible commitment toward labor; 11.3 Credible commitment toward capital; 11.4 The composition of control groups; 11.5 The commodification of control rights; 11.6 Intellectual history and current debates; 11.7 Is workers' control a unitary phenomenon?; 12. Getting there from here: 12.1 Practical considerations; 12.2 A modest proposal; 12.3 Reassuring shareholders; 12.4 Governing firms; 12.5 Trading jobs; 12.6 Sample calculations; 12.7 The long and winding road.