Wittgenstein – Mind and Will: Part I Essays

Acknowledgements.
<p>Preface.</p>
<p>Abbreviations.</p>
<p>Analytical Commentary.</p>
<p>Part I: Intentionality: The Harmony Between Language and Reality (428–65):.</p>
<p>Introduction.</p>
<p>Intentionality.</p>
<p>1. Representation In Thought and Speech.</p>
<p>2. The Tractatus: Form and Content.</p>
<p>3. Repudiation of Causal Theories.</p>
<p>4. A Fresh Start.</p>
<p>5. Dispelling The Confusions (Identity and Surrogationalism; Thinking What Is Not The Case; Knowing What One Thinks; Satisfaction and Fitting; Anticipating The Future; Understanding and Interpreting).</p>
<p>Part II: Justification By Experience (466–90):.</p>
<p>Introduction.</p>
<p>Inductive Reasoning.</p>
<p>6. The Tractatus.</p>
<p>7. Reasons and Reasoning.</p>
<p>8. Justifying Induction.</p>
<p>Part III: The Immanence of Meaning and The Bounds of Sense (491–570):.</p>
<p>Introduction.</p>
<p>The Arbitrariness of Grammar and The Bounds of Sense.</p>
<p>9. Grammar Justified.</p>
<p>10. Grammar Unjustified.</p>
<p>11. Illusory Determinants of The Bounds of Sense.</p>
<p>12. The Arbitrariness of Grammar and The Immanence of Meaning.</p>
<p>13. Traversing The Bounds of Sense.</p>
<p>A Note on Negation 1.</p>
<p>Frege and Russell.</p>
<p>14. The Tractatus Criticisms of Frege.</p>
<p>15. The Meaning Body of Negation.</p>
<p>Part IV: Mental States and Processes (571–610): .</p>
<p>Introduction.</p>
<p>Methodology In Philosophical Psychology.</p>
<p>16. Psychology: A ′Young Science′ Or ′Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion′?.</p>
<p>17. The Descriptive Method In Philosophical Psychology.</p>
<p>18. The Concepts of Psychology and Their Role In Human Life.</p>
<p>19. The Plan For The Treatment of Psychological Concepts.</p>
<p>20. The Preferred Strategy.</p>
<p>Memory and Recognition.</p>
<p>21. The Prevailing Tradition.</p>
<p>22. Memory: Reading The Past Off The Present.</p>
<p>23. Memory Experiences and Processes.</p>
<p>24. Memory Traces and Psycho–Physical Parallelism.</p>
<p>25. Recognition.</p>
<p>26. Plus Ca Change.</p>
<p>Part V: The Will (611–28): .</p>
<p>Introduction.</p>
<p>Willing and The Nature of Voluntary Action.</p>
<p>27. Agency and Action.</p>
<p>28. The Prevalent Tradition.</p>
<p>29. ′My Kinaesthetic Sensations Advise Me′.</p>
<p>30. Is Willing Too Merely An Experience?.</p>
<p>31. Diagnosis.</p>
<p>32. Fantasies of The Will. (The Innervationist and Ideo–Motor Theories; Trying; Causation of Action).</p>
<p>33. Voluntary and Involuntary Action.</p>
<p>Part VI: Intention and Recollecting One′s Intention (629–60): .</p>
<p>Introduction.</p>
<p>Intending.</p>
<p>34. Stage Setting.</p>
<p>35. Wittgenstein: Remembering What One Was Going To.</p>
<p>36. Wittgenstein: Category Distinctions.</p>
<p>37. Intention and Prediction.</p>
<p>38. The Language Game of ′I Intend′.</p>
<p>Part VII: Meaning Something (661–93): .</p>
<p>Introduction.</p>
<p>The Mythology of Meaning Something.</p>
<p>39. A Puzzle About 661–93.</p>
<p>40. Misconceptions About Meaning In The Notebooks and The Tractatus.</p>
<p>41. The Retrospective Reconstruction of The Mythology of Meaning.</p>
<p>42. The Change of Heart.</p>
<p>43. Categorial Differentiations.</p>
<p>44. Meaning What One Says.</p>
<p>45. Reassembling The Jigsaw.</p>