Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action

Introduction; Part I. Conceptual Disputes: Brains as the Locus of Responsibility?: 1. Neuroscience and the explanation of human action Dennis Patterson; 2. 'Nothing but a pack of neurons:' the moral responsibility of the human machine Michael S. Moore; 3. Non-eliminative reductionism: not the theory of mind some responsibility theorists want, but the one they need Katrina Sifferd; 4. Intention as non-observational knowledge: rescuing responsibility from the brain Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov; 5. Efficient causation and neuroscientific explanations of criminal action Nick J. Davis; Part II. Epistemic Disputes: What does Neuroscience Tell Law about Responsibility?: 6. Lying, deception, and fMRI: a critical update Michael S. Pardo; 7. Brain-based lie detection and the mereological fallacy: reasons for optimism John Danaher; 8. Is brain reading mind reading? Pim Haselager and Giulio Mecacci; Part III. Implications for Courts and Defendants: 9. Unlucky, bad, and the space in between: why criminologists should think more about responsibility Peter Raynor; 10. Neuroscience and the criminal jurisdiction: a new approach to reliability and admissibility in the courts of England and Wales Joanna Glynn; 11. Should individuals with psychopathy be compensated for their fearlessness? (Or how neuroscience matters for equality) Marion Godman; 12. The treatment of psychopathy: conceptual and ethical issues Elizabeth Shaw.