Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Introduction<BR>PART I: METAPHYSICS OF AGENCY<BR>1. The Argument from Slips; Santiago Amaya, <BR>2. A Gradualist Metaphysics of Agency; Andrei A. Buckareff and Jesús H. Aguilar<BR>3. Crossing a Mesh Theory with a Reasons-Responsive Theory: Unholy Spawn of an Impending Apocalypse or Love-Child of a New Dawn?; Michael McKenna and Chad Van Schoelandt<BR>4. Classical Compatibilism and Temporal Ontology; Pablo Rychter<BR>PART II: RESPONSIBILITY AND LUCK<BR>5. Reasons and Freedom; Carlos Moya<BR>6. On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism; David Widerker and Ira Schnall<BR>7. Moral Luck and True Desert; Sergi Rosell<BR>8. A New Form of Moral Luck?; Carolina Sartorio<BR>PART III: RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME<BR>9. Helping It; Helen Steward<BR>10. Ought without Ability; Carlos Patarroyo<BR>11. Failures of Vigilance and Forward-Looking Responsibility for Omissions; Derk Pereboom<BR>12. Moral Responsibility Skepticism: Meeting McKenna's Challenge; Neil Levy<BR>13. In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsibility Skepticism: A Reply to Levy; Michael McKenna<BR>PART IV: RESPONSIBILITY AND RELATIONSHIPS<BR>14. Motivated by the Gods: Compartmentalized Agency and Responsibility; Constantine Sandis <BR>15. Friendship, Freedom, and Special Obligations; Dana Nelkin<BR>16. Skepticism About Autonomy and Responsibility as Educational Aims – What Next?; Stefaan Cuypers and Ish Haji