Knowing What Things Are

<div><div>Introduction</div><div><br></div><div>Part I. Toward the Erotetic View </div><div>2. The Knowledge of What Things Are: Possible Views</div><div>2.1 The Knowledge of What Things are as Simple Propositional Knowledge</div><div>2.2 The Knowledge of What Things Are as Practical Knowledge</div><div>2.3 The Knowledge of What Things are as Knowledge by Acquaintance</div><div><br></div><div>3. Questions and Answers: Understanding Knowledge-Wh</div><div>3.1 Knowledge-Wh: The Standard Account</div><div>3.2. Knowledge-Wh and Inquiry-Based Epistemology</div><div>3.3 Knowledge-Wh and Context-Sensitivity</div><div>3.4 Is Knowledge-Wh Context-Sensitive?</div>Concluding Remarks</div><div><br></div><div>4. The Erotetic View</div><div>4.1 Introducing the View</div><div>4.2 Skepticism and Holism</div><div>4.3 Water and H2O: The Question of Necessary Identities</div><div>4.4 The Threat of Excessive Intellectualism </div>4.5 A Brief Clash of Views<div>Concluding Remarks</div><div><br></div><div>Part II. Developing the Erotetic View</div><div>5. The Gradability of the Knowledge of What Things Are</div><div>5.1 The Phenomenon of Gradability</div><div>Concluding Remarks</div><div><br></div><div>6. Social Kinds, the Erotetic View and Erotetic Amelioration</div><div>6.1 The Knowledge of What Social Kinds Are</div><div>6.2 Amelioration: Conceptual and Erotetic</div><div>6.3 The Topic Preservation Challenge</div><div>6.4 The Knowledge of What Strongly Social Kinds Are and Erotetic Amelioration</div><div>Concluding Remarks</div><br><div>7. The Knowledge of What Things Are: Ignorance and Obligations</div><div>7.1 Understanding Ignorance of What Things Are</div><div>7.2 Culpable Ignorance of What Things Are </div><div>7.3 Social Roles and Obligations to Know What Things Are</div><div>7.4 Associativism and Knowing What Things Are</div><div>7.5 Distributive Epistemic Injustice and the Knowledge of What Things Are</div><div>Concluding Remarks</div><div><br></div><div>Appendix A. Having Concepts and Knowing What Things Are</div><div>1. A Psychological View of Concepts</div><div>2. A Philosophical View of Concepts</div><div><br></div><div>Appendix B. Incomplete Understanding of Concepts and the Gradability of the Knowledge of What Things Are</div><div><br></div><div>Appendix C. The Knowledge of What Particular Things Are</div>