Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union

1 - Introduction.- 2 - Strategic delegation in firms competing underincomplete information.- 2.1 Strategic competition and the firm’s organisational design.- 2.2 A model of strategic delegation in duopoly with incomplete information.- 2.3 Equilibrium output and effort provision with strategic delegation.- 2.4 The effort provision under alternative settings.- 2.4.1 No moral hazard.- 2.4.2 Unobservable contracts and non-strategic delegation.- 2.4.3 No delegation.- 2.4.4 Product market competition and agency costs.- 2.5 The case of linear demand.- 2.6 Conclusions.- Appendix 2.1. Proofs of Proposition 2.3 and of Lemma 2.6.- 3 - Delegation contracts’ observability and collusion.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Observability in delegation games.- 3.3 The benchmark model.- 3.4 Non-renegotiable contracts.- 3.5 One round of renegotiation.- 3.6 Delayed observability and renegotiation costs.- 3.7 Conclusions.- Appendix 3.1 - Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and of Corollary 3.7.- Appendix 3.2 - The computation of a collusive equilibrium.- 4 - Strategic delegation in the trade union.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 The nature of the trade union: co-ordination costs and the delegation of authority.- 4.3 A model of bargaining with threats.- 4.4 Direct bargaining.- 4.5 Strategically delegated bargaining.- 4.6 Conclusions.- 5 - Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure.- 5.1 New managers, technological innovation and industry evolution.- 5.2 A model of dynamic competition for managers.- 5.3 Catching-Up.- 5.4 Increasing Dominance.- 5.5 Market structure and returns to managers.- 5.5.1 Constant returns.- 5.5.2 Increasing returns.- 5.5.3 Decreasing returns.- 5.6 Market size and product differentiation with DRM.- 5.6.1 Gross incentives.- 5.6.2 Managers’ prices.- 5.6.3 Simulations.- 5.7 Some welfare implications.- 5.8 Conclusions.- Appendix 5.1 - Programs for the simulations.- 6 - Conclusions.- References.- Declaration.- List of figures.- List of tables.