The Relation Between Leniency and Private Enforcement

Preface

1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Topic
1.3 Comparative and Legal Approach
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
1.5 Remarks

2 Leniency Policy of the European Commission, Germany and the Netherlands
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Effective Leniency Policy
2.3 Leniency Policy of the European Commission
2.4 German Leniency Policy
2.5 Dutch Leniency Policy
2.6 Interaction of Leniency Policies Within the EU
2.7 Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Leniency Policy Within the EU
2.8 Conclusion

3 Development of Private Enforcement at the EU level
3.1 Introduction
3.2 History
3.3 Towards European Antitrust Damages Legislation
3.4 Comparison and Analysis of the Directive and the Papers
3.5 Conclusions

4 Private Enforcement in Germany and the Netherlands
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Private Enforcement in Germany Prior to the Antitrust Damages Directive
4.3 Private Enforcement in the Netherlands Prior to the Antitrust Damages Directive
4.4 Comparison and Analysis of Private Enforcement in Germany and the Netherlands Prior to the Antitrust Damages Directive
4.5 A Quick Overview of Private Enforcement in Other Member States
4.6 Private Enforcement in Germany and the Netherlands and the introduction of the Antitrust Damages Directive
4.7 Conclusions

5 The System in the United States
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Antitrust in the United States
5.3 Similarities and Differences Between Europe and the United States
5.4 Private Enforcement in the United States
5.5 Leniency Policy in the United States
5.6 Evaluation of Competition Law Enforcement in the US and Comparison with Europe
5.7 Conclusions

6 Synopsis
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Main Findings
6.3 Bottlenecks
6.4 Steps Forward and Solutions
6.5 Conclusions

7 Summary and Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Findings
7.3 Recommendations
7.4 Final Conclusions

Samenvatting en conclusies
List of Sources
Table of Cases
Table of Decisions of Authorities
Publications
Curriculum Vitae