Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law

1: Introduction.- 1.General Remarks.- 2.Comparative Law in the Context of European Law.- 3.The Relevance of the Study.- 2: Some Historical and Theoretical Observations.- 1.Preliminary Remarks: The Rhetorical Nature of the Comparative Legal Argument.- 2. Some History.- 2.1. Early comparisons.- 2.2. Modern comparative law.- 2.3. Conclusions.- 3. To the Idea of Comparative Legal Reasoning.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. Traditional approach.- 3.3. Comparative law argument and comparative legal culture.- 3.4. Comparative law as comparative legal reasoning.- 3.5. Conclusions: the basic structure of practical comparative legal reasoning.- 4. General Conclusions.- 3: Comparative Law in European Legal Adjudication.- 1. Introduction.- 1.1. Preliminary remarks.- 1.2. Some “legal” bases for the use of comparative law in adjudicative reasoning.- 1.3. Some observations concerning the material of the study.- 1.4. The use of comparative law in some national legal orders.- 1.4.1. General remarks.- 1.4.2. Comparative reasoning in relation to international legal obligations.- European law and national legal orders.- Other types of international obligations.- 1.4.3. Some examples.- 1.4.4. Some general remarks on internal comparison, mixed courts, and private international law comparison.- 2. Comparative Law in the European Level Case Law.- 2.1. European Community law.- 2.1.1. General remarks.- 2.1.2. On interpretation in Community law.- 2.1.3. The legal basis for the use of comparative law.- 2.1.4. General remarks on the use of comparative law in the European Community legal order.- 2.1.5. Some general remarks on comparative influences in Community law.- 2.1.6. Comparative reasoning in the realm of international law in the European Court of Justice.- 2.1.7. The use of state legal systems in the absence of international obligations.- 2.1.8. Conclusions.- On the basis of the case law.- On the basis of the interviews.- 2.2. The European System of Human Rights.- 2.2.1. General remarks.- 2.2.2. Some examples of comparative reasoning.- Trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.- Corporal punishment in private schools.- Non-enforcement of access and custody rights.- Non-recognition of paternity.- Transsexuality.- Pre-trial detention.- 2.2.3. Comparative reasoning related to Article 10(1 and 2) (“freedom of expression” and “necessity in a democraticsociety”) in of the European System of Human Rights (Cases Handyside, Engel, X v Germany, Arrowsmith, Glimmerveen, Liberal Party, Barthold, Glasenapp, Markt Intern, Groppera, Autronic,Mtiller, Castels v. Spain, Observer, Colman, Chorherr, Informationsverein Lentia, Casado Coca, Jersild, Oberschlick).- 2.2.4. Conclusions on the European System of Human rights.- On the basis of the case law.- On the basis of the interviews.- 2.3. Some general conclusions.- 2.3.1. General remarks.- 2.3.2. Some analysis.- 3. “Hard Cases” and the Comparative Limits of European Law.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. Value based comparative reasoning.- 3.2.1. Hard case I (The Otto Preminger Institute in the European system of human rights).- General remarks.- Context of justification.- Justification.- Some further analysis.- “Morality” and procedural polycentrism.- 3.2.2. Hard case II (Bachmann in the European Court of Justice).- Context of justification.- Justification.- Some analysis.- Conclusions.- 3.3. Traditional comparative reasoning.- 3.3.1 Hard case III (Hoechst in the European Court of Justice).- General remarks.- Context of justification.- The inquiry into the Member States’ systems.- The inquiry into the European System of Human rights.- Conclusions.- Justification.- Some analysis: a principle of individual protection vs. protection of business premises?.- 3.3.2. Hard case IV (Albany in the European Court of Justice).- General remarks.- The facts of the case.- The context of justification (the Advocate General’s opinion).- The Court’s reasoning.- Some other studies.- Some conclusions.- Collective agreements and competition law; basic rights, market rights, and the hierarchy of these rights based on the idea of functional interpretation.- General conclusions.- 3.4. Functional comparative reasoning: Hard case V (Kalanke in the European Court of Justice).- 3.4.1. General remarks.- 3.4.2. Comparative law as acceptable and non-acceptable legal source.- 3.4.3. “Substantive equality”.- 3.4.4. Some analysis.- 3.4.5. Comparative generalities, the paradox, and the use of third law.- 3.4.6. Substantive equality as a cultural argument, the limits of law, and functional law.- 3.4.7. A systematic interpretation?.- 3.4.8. Epilogue I: Structural inequality.- 3.4.9. Epilogue II: a vertical comparative analysis.- 3.4.10. Final conclusions.- 3.5. Conclusions on the hard cases.- 4: Conclusions.- 1. Comparative European Law and European Comparative Law.- 1.1. Preliminary remarks.- 1.2. The intellectual dimension: forms of interaction of arguments and legal systems.- 1.2.1. General remarks.- 1.2.2. The analytical quality of comparative arguments, the “stages of coherence”, and the legal integrity of systems.- 1.3. Motives for comparative reasoning in European law.- 1.3.1. General remarks.- 1.3.2. The forms of traditional “self-construction”, control of compliance, and integrative interpretation.- 1 3.3 Maintenance of “reasonable autonomy” and the role of comparative considerations in substituting the travaux préparatoires.- 1.3.4. Implementation of changes in a persuasive way; the strength of the normative solution.- 1.3.5. The stability function: the strength of the argument, the judicial self-restraint, and the relative dynamics and stability.- 1.3.6. Comparative reasoning directing the future interpretations in national and European legal systems.- 1.4. The institutional dimension.- 1.4.1. Institutional reasoning in European law.- 1.4.2. The structure of the European level institutional comparative law.- 1.5. Conclusions.- 1.5.1. The function of comparative law in the evolution of European law.- 1.5.2. Problems of evolution?.- 2. Conclusions on European Law.- 2.1. General remarks: toward a “reflexive” theory of European law.- 2.2. Is there justification for the (institutional) non-discursive reflexivity?.- 2.3. Integrative reflexivity and European comparative rules.- 2.4. European comparative dogmatics and vertical comparisons.- 2.5. Conclusions.- Epilogue.- 1. Contemporary Comparative Law.- 2. What Kind of Institutional Justification is Comparative Legal Justification?.- Literature.- Interviews.