Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

Name: Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
Author: Demet Cetiner

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Paperback, 168 blz. | Engels

Springer Berlin Heidelberg | 2013e druk, 2013

ISBN13: 9783642358210

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Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2013e druk, 2013 9783642358210

Onderdeel van serie Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Specificaties

ISBN13:9783642358210

Taal:Engels

Bindwijze:paperback

Aantal pagina's:168

Uitgever:Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Druk:2013

Hoofdrubriek:Algemeen management, Inkoop en logistiek

Serie:Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Inhoudsopgave

Introduction.- Selected Topics in Revenue Management.- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances.- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory.- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game.- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances.- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances.- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices.- Conclusion and Future Research.- Appendix: Computational Study.