The Development of Husserl’s Thought

One Philosophy as Descriptive Psychology.- I. Acts, Contents and the Relations between Them.- Section 1. The Intentional Relation to the Object.- § 1. The Distinction between Act and Content.- § 2. Acts of a Higher Order.- § 3. Symbolic or Non-genuine Presentations.- I. In Philosophie der Arithmetik.- II. In “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik”.- Section 2. Contents.- § 1. The Immanence of Contents.- I. In Brentano’s Thought.- II. In Philosophie der Arithmetik.- III. In “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik”.- § 2. The Division of Contents — Abstract and Concrete Contents.- § 3. Formal or Categorial Properties — Objects of a Higher Order?.- Section 3. The Relation between Act and Content.- § 1. Are Acts Creative?.- § 2. The Correlation between Act and Object.- § 3. Perception and Evidence.- § 4. The Relation to the “Real” Object and the “Intentional” Object.- I. Brentano.- II. Husserl.- Summary of Chapter I.- II. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology.- § 1. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology in Brentano’s Thought.- I. Genetic Psychology.- II. Descriptive Psychology.- § 2. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology in the Thought of the Early Husserl.- III. Philosophy as Analysis of Origins.- § 1. The Analysis of Origins in Arithmetic.- § 2. What is Analysis of Origins?.- § 3. The Basis for Abstraction — the Origin.- § 4. The General Concept.- § 5. Abstraction.- IV. The A Priori Sciences and the Problem of their Founding.- § 1. Brentano’s Theory of the A Priori Sciences.- § 2. Husserl’s Theory of the A Priori Sciences.- § 3. Logic and Psychology.- V. Brentano and Husserl.- § 1. Husserl’s Student Years — the Encounter with Brentano.- § 2. Brentano’s Development.- I. The Positivistic Period.- II. Phenomenological Tendencies.- III. Some Problems.- VI. Preliminary Conclusions.- § 1. Philosophy as Descriptive Psychology — Forms of Psychologism.- § 2.Some Critical Observations.- Two Philosophy as Descriptive Eidetic Psychology.- I. Acts, Objects and the Relations between Them.- Section 1. Acts.- § 1. Introduction — the Natural and Phenomenological Thougt-Stances.- § 2. Significative Acts.- § 3. “Imaginal” or Imaginative Acts.- § 4. Perceptual Acts.- § 5. More Analysis of Acts.- I. The Essential Elements of Acts — Quality and Matter.- II. The Non-essential Elements of Acts — the Sensations.- III. The Connection between the Acts — Knowledge.- § 6. Categorial Acts.- § 7. General Presentations or Acts of Ideation.- § 8. The Natural and Phenomenological Attitudes — a Provisional Summary.- Section 2. The Transcendent Object.- Section 3. The Relations between Acts and Contents.- § 1. The Concept of Constitution.- § 2. The Correlation between the Act and the Object.- § 3. The Theory of Perception.- I. Adequate and Non-adequate Perception.- II. The Phenomenological Point of Departure — “Presupposition-lessness”.- III. The Suspension of the Question of Existence (Epoché).- § 4. Theory of Knowledge as a “Psychology of Reason”.- I. Two Questions.- II. A First Answer.- III. The Possibility of a Second Answer.- IV. A Second Answer.- § 5. The Intentional Object and the “Real” Object.- I. Husserl and the Scholastic Schema.- II. The “Real” Object and the Physical Object.- § 6. The Natural and Phenomenological Attitudes in LU — Conclusion.- II. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology.- § 1. Genetic Psychology.- § 2. Descriptive Psychology.- § 3. The Two Functions of Descriptive Psychology.- § 4. Husserl’s Criticism of Explanatory Psychology.- § 5. Two Kinds of Methods (Ontologies) — Naturalistic and Phenomenological.- § 6. Conclusions of Chapters I and II.- III. The New Theory of Abstraction.- § 1. Recapitulation of the Problem.- § 2. General Presentation: Meaning and Intuiting.- § 3. Comparison: Identity and Similarity.- § 4. Attention and the Intuition of Essences.- § 5. “Grounded Purely in Concepts” — Evidence.- § 6. The Eidetic Reduction.- § 7. Two Kinds of Abstraction.- § 8. Two Kinds of Categorial Abstraction — Two Kinds of Logic.- § 9. Eidos and Fact.- I. The Identity of the Eidos.- II. The Universality of the Eidos.- III. Application.- IV. The Extent of the Realm of Ideas.- §10. Husserl’s “Platonism” or “Realism”.- IV. Logic and Psychology.- § 1. Statement of the Problem.- § 2. The Psychological Concept and the Logical Concept.- § 3. The Laws of Logic.- V. Philosophy as Analysis of Origins.- Section 1. The Philosophical Clarification of Arithmetic.- Section 2. The Philosophical Clarification of Pure Logic.- § 1. The Philosophy of Pure Logic.- § 2. The Origin of the Fundamental Concepts of Logic.- § 3.The Problem of the Relation between the Prolegomena and the Six Investigations.- I. The Problem.- II. Pure Logic and Descriptive Psychology.- III. Some Critical Observations.- VI. Conclusions.- § 1. Phenomenology as Descriptive Eidetic Psychology.- § 2. Forms of Psychologism.- Intermezzo from Descriptive Psychology to Transcendental Phenomenology.- I. The Negative Aspect of the Reduction — The Epoche.- § 1. The Suspension of all Transcendencies.- § 2. The Implications of this Suspension.- § 3. Conclusions.- II. The Positive Aspect of the Reduction — The Residue.- § 1. Consciousness — Real Immanence.- § 2. Essences — Pure Immanence.- § 3. The Givenness of the Noema.- I. The Second Extension of the Phenomenological Sphere.- II. The Correlativity Theme and the Problem of Transcendence.- III. From Descriptive Psychology to Transcendental Phenomenology.- Three Philosophy as Transcendental Phenomenology.- I. An Analysis of the Phenomenological Fundamental Consideration.- § 1. The Introduction of the Transcendental Epoché.- § 2. Phenomenological Meditation — Its Problem, Goal and Method.- § 3. The First Phase — Consciousness as a Monadological Unity.- § 4. Intermezzo — Transition to the Second Phase.- § 5. The Second Phase — The Presumptive Being of the Thing and the Absolute Being of Consciousness.- § 6. The Experiment of World-Annihilation.- § 7. The Meaning of the Terms “Absolute” and “Relative”.- I. The Concepts “Absolute” and “Relative” in LU.- II. The Concepts “Absolute” and “Relative” in Ideen I.- III. Provisional Conclusions.- § 8. Eidetic and Factual Necessity.- § 9. Consciousnesss as the Necessary Condition and Sufficient Reason of the World.- §10. The World as Presumptive.- §11. Conclusion of the Second Phase.- §12. Interpreting the Transcendental Epoché.- I. The Introduction of the Epoché.- II. The Interpretation of the Epoché.- §13. The Problem of the “Ways” to Transcendental Phenomenology.- §14. Two Interpretations — Stumpf and Ricoeur.- I. Stumpf.- II. Ricoeur.- §15. Two Assumptions.- §16. The Meaning of the Fundamental Consideration as Fundamental Ontology.- I. The Naturalistic World-Picture.- II. The Phenomenological View.- §17. The Naturalistic Attitude and the Personalistic Attitude in Ideen II.- II. Psychological and Transcendental Epistemology.- § 1. Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism.- I. No “Thing in Itself”.- II. The Traditional Problem of Knowledge.- III. Husserl’s Solution.- IV. Comparison with Logische Untersuchungen.- V. The Concept of Constitution.- § 2. The Thing in Itself and Natural Science.- I. The Thing of Physics in Ideen I.- II.Comparison with Logische UntersuchungenandKrisis.- § 3.The Psychological and Transcendental Concepts of the Noema.- I. The Introduction of the Concept of the Noema.- II. Intermezzo — The Psychological Epoché and the Transcendental Epoché.- III. The Way from Psychology.- § 4. Noetic-Noematic Parallelism and the Phenomenology of Reason.- I. Noetic-Noematic Parallelism.- II. Phenomenology of Reason.- III. Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.- Section I. Transcendental Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology.- § 1. The Agreement between Descriptive Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.- § 2. The Difference between Descriptive Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.- § 3. The Relation between Psychological Consciousness and Transcendental Consciousness (Ego).- Section II. Transcendental Phenomenology and Empirical Psychology.- § 1. The Limits and Possibilities of Empirical Psychology.- § 2. Empirical Psychology and Phenomenological Philosophy.- IV. Transcendental Phenomenology and the A Priori Sciences.- § 1. Mundane Eidetics and Transcendental Phenomenological Eidetics.- § 2. Philosophy of Pure Logic.- V. Conclusion.- § 1. Husserl’s Defense of the Ideal.- § 2. The Turn to Transcendental Idealism.- Translation Table.- Name Index.